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Abstract  
QBism is one of the main candidates for an epistemic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. According to QBism, the quantum state or the wavefunction 
represents the subjective degrees of belief of the agent assigning the state. But, 
although the quantum state is not part of the furniture of the world, quantum 
mechanics grasps the real via the Born rule which is a consistency condition for 
the probability assignments of the agent. In this paper, we evaluate the 
plausibility of recent criticism of QBism. We focus on the consequences of the 
subjective character of the quantum state, the issue of realism and the problem 
of the evolution of the quantum state in QBism. In particular, drawing upon 
Born’s notion of invariance as the mark of the real, it is argued that there is no 
essential difference between Einstein’s program of ‘the real’ and QBists’ realism. 
Also, it will be argued that QBism can account for the unitary evolution of the 
quantum state.  
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1. Introduction  
In recent times we have been witnessing a turn towards epistemic interpretations 
of quantum mechanics. According to all these interpretations the quantum state 
somehow represents the knowledge, information or beliefs of the user of 
quantum mechanics. QBism is one such interpretation. Other notable epistemic 
interpretations include Rovelli (1996); Zeilinger (1999, 2005); Healey (2012); 
Friederich (2015); Mueller (2017); Brukner (2017) and Boge (2018). In this respect 
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it should be noted that there are in general three options for interpreting 
quantum mechanics (Leifer 2011):  
1. The quantum state is epistemic and there is some underlying ontic state. 
2. The quantum state is epistemic but there is no deeper underlying reality. 
3. The quantum state is ontic.  
Consequently, it is worth examining the prospects for the epistemic interpretation 
as a viable interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this article, we focus on the 
status of QBism as a candidate among them.  
QBism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics and more broadly a philosophy 
of science inspired by the implications of quantum information theory (Fuchs 
2002). Its main proponents are Christopher Fuchs, Rüdiger Schack and David 
Mermin (see e.g. Mermin (2012, 2014); Fuchs (2010); Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack 
(2014)).   
According to QBism, the quantum state or the wavefunction represents the 
subjective degrees of belief of the agent assigning it. The quantum state is not 
part of the furniture of the world. On the other hand, the quantum system is an 
objective element of reality and part of the stuff of the world. Quantum 
mechanics is about the actions or measurements of the agent on the quantum 
system and the reactions she receives from the quantum system in the form of 
measurement outcomes. For QBists, as Fuchs et al. (2014) put it, ‘quantum 
mechanics is a tool anyone can use to evaluate, on the basis of one’s past 
experience, one’s probabilistic expectations for one’s subsequent experience’. In 
other words, quantum mechanics provides the agent with coherence conditions 
for assigning probabilities (Fuchs and Schack 2018). This coherence condition is 
fulfilled through the Born rule. Quantum mechanics advises the agent to assign 
and update her probabilities so that the Born rule is satisfied. This normative 
character of the Born rule is an important tenet of QBism. Being normative, the 
Born rule neither describes how nature actually is, nor does it tell nature what to 
do. It is rather an ideal relation an agent strives for in her probability assignments. 
3 
 
The importance of measurement for QBism links it with Bohr and Copenhagen-
type interpretations.2 This centrality of measurement is an essential element of 
what is known as operationalism. However, for QBists, quantum theory is not just 
about measurements or a tool to predict measurement outcomes. QBism is a 
realist rather than an instrumentalist program as will be explained in the course of 
the paper. 
Its proponents believe that QBism solves the longstanding puzzles of quantum 
mechanics such as the collapse of the wave function and nonlocality. However, 
QBism is not without its critics. There have been critical stands toward QBism in 
the literature (see e.g. Timpson (2008); Bacciagaluppi (2014)). Recently, Brown 
(2017) has put forward a critical review of QBism which improves upon some 
points in Timpson’s 2008 critique and also offers new lines of attack. The aim of 
this paper is to evaluate the plausibility of Brown’s arguments against QBism.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, Brown’s argument for 
considering the quantum state as part of the stuff of the world is evaluated and 
rejected. Section 3 offers an answer to Brown’s criticism that QBism faces an 
explanatory gap regarding the objective description of the world. Sections 4 and 5 
contain the heart of the paper. In section 4, drawing upon Born’s notion of 
invariance as the mark of the real, it is argued that there is no essential difference 
between the Einstein’s program of ‘the real’ and the QBists’ program. In the next 
section, it will be argued that QBism can account for the unitary evolution of the 
quantum state. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude with the findings of the paper.  
2. Are quantum states part of the stuff of the world?  
Brown claims that there are powerful plausibility arguments for the view that the 
quantum state is something real and,  
‘They almost all have to do, in one way or another, with quantum phase, with the 
fact that the wavefunction, in its relation to probability, is strictly a (generally 
complex) probability amplitude: it has more structure than a probability 
distribution does.’ (Brown 2017; 5) 
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So, according to this argument, the wavefunction has properties such as 
interference and entanglement which, it is claimed, to explain them one has to 
regard the wavefunction as something real, i.e., as describing or representing the 
way the world is. However, QBists maintain that quantum states are degrees of 
belief of an agent concerning her measurement outcomes. A quantum state is a 
catalogue of beliefs. But if so, there seems to be an ‘explanatory deficit’ in QBism 
(Timpson 2008). For example, consider interference phenomena. The proponents 
of an explanatory deficit in QBism claim that it could explain why an agent would 
believe in interference phenomena but could not explain why these phenomena 
occur. It seems that the quantum state has properties such as interference which 
could not be regarded as beliefs. Therefore, the quantum state is more than a 
subjective catalogue of beliefs. ‘It has more structure than a probability 
distribution does’. 
However, as will be shown below, the response to the objection that the 
quantum state is a probability amplitude and consequently more than a 
probability distribution lies in the fact that we could express the quantum state in 
terms of a pure probability distribution using minimal informationally complete 
(MIC) measurements (DeBrota et al., 2019; 2020). Or, we could give the Born rule 
in terms of pure probabilities using symmetric informationally complete (SIC) 
measurements (Fuchs 2017b).   
Consider a quantum system with a 𝑑-dimensional Hilbert space 𝐻𝑑  , and suppose 
that there is a SIC measurement for it. Let us call its outcomes 𝑂𝑖  , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑑
2.3 A 
SIC is a set of 𝑑2 rank-one projection operators Π𝑖 =   𝜓𝑖  𝜓𝑖    such that (Appleby 
et al., 2017):  
𝑡𝑟 Π𝑘Π𝑙 =
𝑑𝛿𝑘𝑙 + 1
𝑑 + 1
                                                                                                         1  
Such a set of operators when rescaled appropriately form a positive-operator-
valued measure (POVM), i.e.,  
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 𝑂𝑖
𝑖
=  
1
𝑑
Π𝑖
𝑖
= 𝐼                                                                                                         (2) 
Moreover, these operators are linearly independent and form a complete basis 
for the space of Hermitian operators, so that the probabilities for the outcomes of 
a SIC measurement 𝑝(𝑂𝑖) determine the quantum state 𝜌. That is, if 
𝑝 𝑂𝑖 =
1
𝑑
𝑡𝑟 𝜌Π𝑖                                                                                                             (3) 
then 
𝜌 =    𝑑 + 1 𝑝 𝑂𝑖 −
1
𝑑
 Π𝑖
𝑑2
𝑖=1
                                                                                      (4) 
Furthermore, using equation (4), we can express the Born rule directly in terms of 
probabilities, without ever invoking amplitudes. For a quantum state 𝜌 and a 
measurement  𝐸𝑗  , the Born rule gives the probabilities of the measurement 
outcomes according to  
𝑄 𝐸𝑗  = 𝑡𝑟 𝜌𝐸𝑗                                                                                                                  (5) 
Substituting equation (4) in the formula (5) gives (Fuchs and Schack 2013; Fuchs 
2017b):  
𝑄 𝐸𝑗  =    𝑑 + 1 𝑝 𝑂𝑖 −
1
𝑑
 𝑝 𝐸𝑗  𝑂𝑖 
𝑑2
𝑖=1
                                                                 (6) 
In the above equation, we have  
𝑝 𝐸𝑗  𝑂𝑖 = 𝑡𝑟 𝐸𝑗Π𝑖                                                                                                          (7) 
which is a conditional probability for 𝐸𝑗  upon having obtained 𝑂𝑖 . This is because 
an agent performing a SIC measurement on a system with state 𝜌 and then going 
to the measurement  𝐸𝑗  , has to update from 𝜌 to Π𝑖  using Lüders rule.     
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But, one might object that there is no proof for the existence of SICs in all 
dimensions.4 However, it is not fatal to the above argument as one could express 
the Born rule using any informationally complete POVM which are known to 
always exist (DeBrota and Stacey 2019). The only difference is that in this case the 
formula for the Born rule would be more complicated. Still, the concepts are the 
same. Here, it should be emphasized that for QBists it is the Born rule that is the 
fundamental element of quantum mechanics, not the POVMs or the quantum 
states. The distinctive structure of the Born rule in contrast to the classical Law of 
Total Probability is what gives quantum mechanics its characteristic features, 
notably its Hilbert space structure (Fuchs and Stacey 2019).   
Moreover, why does the Born rule have such a central role in the formalism of 
quantum mechanics? The Born rule allows calculating probabilities using the 
quantum states. Conversely, assigning probabilities for any sufficiently rich set of 
measurements, or even for a single but informationally complete measurement 
as we have shown, is mathematically equivalent to assigning a quantum state 
itself. The two kinds of assignments determine each other uniquely (Fuchs 2010). 
Therefore, as Boge puts it:  
‘There are reasons to suspect that QM is an inherently probabilistic theory, and 
depending on one’s interpretation of probability (or the probabilities at play, at 
any rate) this could again be fleshed out to mean that knowledge or information 
or belief. . . are at stake in some sense in the interpretation of QM all along.’ 
(Boge 2018; 290) 
 
But, if the quantum state is epistemic and represents the beliefs of the agent 
assigning the quantum state, what are these beliefs about? And since the 
quantum state is the essential element of quantum mechanics, this amounts to 
the following question: what is quantum mechanics about? We turn to that in the 
next section.   
 
3. What is quantum mechanics about according to QBism?  
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According to a common understanding, science is about describing an external 
mind-independent world without any recourse to the observer. In other words, 
science is about an objective world by virtue of eliminating the role of the 
observer in the scientific enterprise. However, QBists believe that this is a 
misunderstanding of science ‘because everything any of us knows about the 
world is constructed out of his or her individual private experience, it can be 
unwise to rely on a picture of physical world from which personal experience has 
been explicitly excluded, as it has been from physical science’ (Fuchs et al., 2014). 
They argue that QBism corrects this misconception by putting the observer back 
into science (Mermin 2014). In particular,  
‘A QBist takes quantum mechanics to be a personal mode of thought – a very 
powerful tool that any agent can use to organize her own experience. … But 
quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world; it deals 
with the experiences of that objective world that belong to whatever particular 
agent is making use of the quantum theory.’ (Fuchs et al. 2014; 750)  
What does it mean that quantum mechanics is a personal mode of thought? In 
QBism, any agent who uses quantum mechanics models all phenomena except 
her direct internal awareness of her private experience according to it. To do this, 
she relies on her past experience to assign quantum states to her systems of 
interest. The quantum states are probability assignments which express the 
agent’s probabilistic expectations for her future experience. From the QBist’s 
subjective view on probabilities it follows that the agent’s probability assignments 
express her degrees of belief about her future experience.  
Although, Brown shares the subjective interpretation of probability with QBism, 
he does not accept  
‘the further inference in QBism that our scientific reasoning should primarily be 
about personal experiences, our “beliefs”, and not the objective world’. (Brown 
2017; 15)   
Brown’s examples of what constitutes a description of the objective world are 
interesting and deserve attention in their own right for what follows. He mentions 
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the explanation of what has actually happened in the early universe and what has 
actually been happening inside the stars since they are examples of what science 
should try to tell us about the objective world. According to QBism, what science 
has to tell us on these matters are models constructed to account for current 
astrophysical data and observations. But, Brown claims that here ‘we seem to be 
left with an explanatory gap’ (ibid.). He means that the QBist’s answer leaves 
unexplained what was going on in the early universe or has been going on inside 
the stars. From this viewpoint, science should give us a description of the world 
according to what Pauli calls ‘the ideal of the detached observer’:  
‘To put it drastically the observer has according to this ideal to disappear entirely 
in a discrete manner as hidden spectator, never as actor, nature being left alone 
in a predetermined course of events, independent of the way in which the 
phenomena are observed.’ (Pauli, as quoted in Fuchs 2017b; 23) 
Interestingly, Pauli notes that the historical origin of this ideal goes back to 
celestial mechanics. Note that Brown’s examples are also taken at least partly 
from celestial mechanics.  
However, as Pauli emphasizes, quantum mechanics forces us to abandon this 
ideal of the detached observer. This is formally expressed by the reduction of 
wave packet upon measurement. Accordingly, there is an inevitable and 
unpredictable change of the state of the system upon measurement. This for 
Pauli implies the abandonment of the idea of the detachment of the observer 
from the course of physical events outside herself. Why? It is because for Pauli as 
for QBists the measurement instruments are literally extensions of the agent. In 
order to illustrate the point of the argument, let us first look at what Bohr has to 
say about the ideal of the detached observer:  
‘We have in quantum physics attained the same goal [of keeping the ideal of the 
detached observer] by recognizing that we are always speaking of well defined 
observations obtained under specified experimental conditions. These conditions 
can be communicated to everyone who also can convince himself of the factual 
character of the observations by looking on the permanent marks on the 
photographic plates.’ (Bohr, as quoted in Fuchs 2017b; 23) 
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So, according to Bohr’s argument, the detachment of the observer from the 
course of physical events outside herself is secured through the elimination of the 
subjective elements in the account of experience. That is, the experimental 
arrangement is independent from the whim of the agent in the sense that its 
factual character could be checked by everyone by looking at the permanent 
marks obtained through the experiment.  
But, as Pauli emphasizes, reference to experimental conditions is ‘information on 
the observer’ and establishment of an experimental arrangement is an ‘action of 
the observer’ (Fuchs 2015; 46). As Fine (1986; 155) puts it, ‘the probabilities of the 
theory are generally understood as probabilities for various measurement 
outcomes and, so understood, suppose a prearranged apparatus for 
measurement – and hence a measurer-observer of some sort’. Reference to 
factual character of the observations obtained under well defined experimental 
conditions could eliminate the role of this or that observer but in no way could 
eliminate the subjective element in general. The establishment of the 
experimental arrangement is in a sense the embodiment of the observer.   
According to QBism, the experimental apparatus are the extensions of the agent 
in the sense that the outcomes of the experiments carried out by those apparatus 
are personal experiences of that agent. That is why Bohr (1949) insists on using 
‘unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical 
physics’ to express the set-up and outcomes of the experiments. As Mermin puts 
it:  
‘Ordinary language was enormously important to Bohr. An essential part of an 
experiment was reporting it to others. I always found this puzzling. If the outcome 
of an experiment is an objective classical fact, why is it so important to be able to 
communicate it to other people in ordinary language? Why can’t they just look for 
themselves?’ (Mermin 2018; 20) 
The QBists’ answer is that since the outcomes of the experiments are the 
personal experiences of the agent using an unambiguous language is the only way 
to communicate them. For QBists, “Wigner’s friend” (Wigner 1961) shows that we 
should recognize as fundamental rather than paradoxical the outcomes of 
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experiments being personal experiences of the agent carrying out the 
experiment. In Wigner’s friend scenario, Wigner and his friend assign different 
quantum states to the same quantum system. Now the question is this: which 
one is correct? If the outcome of an experiment is an objective classical fact 
available for anyone’s inspection why should Wigner and his friend assign 
different states to the same system? One might answer that they have different 
states of information. But, who has the right state of information? According to 
QBism, the whole puzzle stems from insisting on taking what are personal 
experiences as agent-independent objective facts. 
Moreover, as Ihde (1991) argues, the experimental instruments are not neutral 
windows on the world-in-itself. They are ‘hermeneutic devices’ that prepare and 
make readable what we call scientific objects (Ihde 1998; 149). Through the 
mediation of experimental instruments, our experience is already of an 
interpreted reality.   
Now we are ready to answer Brown’s criticism that QBism faces an explanatory 
gap regarding the objective description of the world. He claims that the question 
‘what was evolving in the early universe, if not quantum states?’ leads nowhere in 
QBism. Because according to QBism, quantum states are probability assignments 
of agents and there were no agents in the early universe to assign them. 
However, in the light of the above discussion, Brown’s criticism suffers from a 
misconception about science. It is exactly the misconception that QBism seeks to 
correct. Science is not a neutral description of a mind-independent world. All of 
our descriptions of the past and future of the world are nothing but our beliefs 
based on current experimental data and observations. And all these data and 
observations are obtained through experimental conditions that are without 
exception instrumentally-mediated which in turn means that we are already 
experiencing an interpreted reality. The experimental arrangement is the 
extended embodiment of the agent. Referring to the objective character of the 
experimental arrangements and the results obtained based on them to secure the 
elimination of the subjective element is doomed to failure. This maneuver could 
at best eliminate the role of particular agents but not the agent in general. One 
could say that our scientific facts are the beliefs of the scientific community. That 
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is, they are types of beliefs that could withstand intersubjective testing. To the 
question ‘what was going on in the early universe?’ the only answer is that what 
‘we say about the past’ is really a statement about what we expect for our 
futures. This belief is not and could not be about the early universe itself rather it 
concerns our model to account for current data and observations. Beyond and 
behind this conceptual model we have access to nothing in principle.5   
The charge of the existence of an explanatory gap in QBism stems from a 
particular conception of the nature of physical theories that QBists are not 
committed to. According to this representationalist view, theories must or do 
represent reality as it is in itself. Consequently, there is an explanatory gap in 
QBism because the quantum states represent degrees of belief of the agents and 
not reality. But, quantum theory is about the outcomes of the actions or 
interventions of the agents on the world. As Finkelstein (1996) puts it, ‘quantum 
physics is action physics’. A quantum state is a state of belief about the outcomes 
of the agent’s actions on the quantum system rather than a third-person 
representation of a reality in itself. This issue of representation and reality 
deserves more attention and will be considered more fully in the following 
section. 
 
4. Einstein’s Realism and QBists’ Realism 
Regarding the relation between QBism and Einstein’s philosophy of science, Fuchs 
points out that he ‘cannot see any way in which the program of QBism has ever 
contradicted what Einstein calls the program of “the real”.’ (Fuchs 2017a; 118)  
However, Brown argues that there is an essential difference between the 
program of QBism and Einstein’s program. According to QBists,  
‘… the best understanding of quantum theory is obtained by recognizing that 
quantum states, quantum time-evolution maps, and the outcomes of quantum 
measurements all live within what Einstein calls the subjective factor.’ (ibid., 119)  
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Brown claims that this is antithetical to Einstein’s program because it leaves the 
objective factor out. Brown believes that for Einstein, quantum states are 
probability distributions over hidden variables and these are the objective factor, 
i.e. correspond to concepts independent of perception.   
However, it is not the case that there is no objective factor in the QBists’ program. 
For QBists the objective factor is the quantum system which is a “real existence” 
external to the agent (Fuchs 2010). This point notwithstanding, Brown argues that 
the nature of the external world of QBism is ‘ineffable’ and so something of little 
interest to Einstein:  
‘The external physical systems float free of the quantum formalism. No 
describable objective attributes can be assigned to these systems in QBism, 
because, as we have seen, the universe is made of something other than quantum 
states, and quantum states are all we have in the formalism of quantum 
mechanics.’ (Brown 2017; 21) 
But, we think this argument is implausible. According to QBism, quantum 
mechanics deals with the experiences of the agents using quantum mechanics. In 
this view, the notion of an agent-independent reality is constructed through 
intersubjective testing of the experiences of agents. Different agents could 
communicate their experiences to each other and through intersubjective testing 
‘a common body of reality can be constructed’ (Fuchs et al., 2014). What we call 
‘the world’ is constructed from our intersubjective experiences. The quantum 
state represents ‘one’s probabilistic expectations for one’s subsequent 
experience’. This is the scope of our knowledge. And we use this knowledge to 
find our way through the maze of experience. As will be shown below, we do not 
think Einstein’s program is any different.  
In order to assess the plausibility of Brown’s criticism it is necessary to see what 
Einstein’s program of “the real” is. For Einstein,  
‘The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, as complete as 
possible, of the connection between the sense experiences in their totality, and, 
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on the other hand, the accomplishment of this aim by the use of a minimum of 
primary concepts and relations.’ (Einstein 1936; 352) 
In other words, according to Einstein’s program of the real, in physics we take the 
existence of sense impressions or experiences as given and try to understand the 
connections between them by constructing a conceptual system. This conceptual 
system has a layered structure. At the lowest level lie primary concepts which are 
‘directly and intuitively connected with typical complexes of sense experiences’. 
However, this first layer lacks logical unity. In order to supply our conceptual 
system with logical unity we invent concepts and relations which are only 
indirectly connected with sense experiences, i.e. retaining the primary concepts 
and relations as logically derived concepts and relations. Striving for more unity, 
we invent a tertiary level of concepts and relations for deduction of the concepts 
and relations of secondary and so indirectly of the primary layer. This process 
goes on until a conceptual system with greatest unity is achieved which is 
compatible with our sense experiences. We assume this aim in physics but there 
is no guarantee that it would result in a definite system.  
So, what is the real or the objective factor in Einstein’s program? It has to do with 
sense impressions because everything else is the free creation of human mind. 
Accordingly, Einstein (1949) defines the objective factor as the totality of those 
concepts and relations which are independent of the act of perception. But, what 
does it mean for a totality of concepts and relations to be independent of the act 
of perception? We think for an answer we should turn to what Max Born has to 
say about the concept of reality in physics:  
‘It presupposes that our sense impressions are not a permanent hallucination, but 
the indications of, or signals from, an external world which exists independently 
of us. Although these signals change and move in a most bewildering way, we are 
aware of objects with invariant properties. The set of these invariants of our 
sense impressions is the physical reality which our mind constructs in a perfectly 
unconscious way. This chair here looks different with each movement of my head, 
each twinkle of my eye, yet I perceive it as the same chair. Science is nothing else 
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than the endeavour to construct these invariants where they are not obvious.’ 
(Born 1949; 103-4)  
Einstein advocates a similar view:   
‘By the aid of speech different individuals can, to a certain extent, compare their 
experiences. In this way it is shown that certain sense perceptions of different 
individuals correspond to each other, while for other sense perceptions no such 
correspondence can be established. We are accustomed to regard as real those 
sense perceptions which are common to different individuals, and which 
therefore are, in a measure, impersonal. The natural sciences, and in particular, 
the most fundamental of them, physics, deal with such sense perceptions.’ 
(Einstein 1922; 1) 
 
Therefore, as Born (1953) emphasizes, ‘the idea of invariant is the clue to a 
rational concept of reality’. Similarly, according to QBism, the invariant in 
quantum mechanics is the Born rule. All agents should strive to form their 
probabilistic expectations of the consequences of their measurements such that 
the Born rule is satisfied. Violating the Born rule would result in disastrous 
consequences. Quantum mechanics grasps the real through the Born rule.   
 
So, we think what Einstein calls the ‘objective factor’ corresponds to what Born 
calls the ‘invariants of our sense impressions’. Both are defined by independence 
from the act of perception. For Einstein, the objective factor is what justifies the 
construction of conceptual systems, i.e. differentiates them from empty logical 
schemes. But, why for Einstein is not the objective factor the sense impressions 
themselves? It is because the sense impressions by themselves lack invariance. By 
constructing concepts and relations between them we achieve a degree of 
invariance and thereby  
‘We are able to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of sense impressions. These 
notions and relations, although free statements of our thoughts, appear to us as 
stronger and more unalterable than the individual sense experience itself, the 
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character of which as anything other than the result of an illusion or hallucination 
is never completely guaranteed.’ (Einstein 1936; 350, emphasis added)  
The important point, as Fine (1986) emphasizes, is that in Einstein’s program of 
the real there is nothing (such as an external reality) that stands ‘outside’ the 
conceptual system to which our concepts could be compared.6 We are situated in 
‘the labyrinth of sense impressions’ and it is the conceptual system that tells us 
what the reality is. As Einstein in a letter to Schrödinger in 19 June 1935 points 
out:  
‘The real difficulty lies therein that physics is a kind of metaphysics; physics 
describes “reality”. But we do not know what “reality” is; we only know it through 
physical description!’ (von Meyenn 2011, 537)  
To sum up, in both the QBists’ program and Einstein’s program, the aim of science 
is to guide us through the maze of experience and accordingly the sole 
justification for our theories or conceptual systems is their success in doing so 
(Fuchs 2017a; Einstein 1936). We do not see any essential difference between the 
two programs.  
However, one might object that according to Einstein’s program of the real we do 
know reality through physical description whereas on QBism that remains to be 
seen. But, here also there is no essential difference between the two programs. 
According to QBism, physical theories are not ‘attempts to directly represent 
(map, picture, copy, correspond to, correlate with) the universe—with “universe” 
here thought of in totality as a pre-existing, static system; an unchanging, 
monistic something that just is’ (Fuchs 2010). As Howard and Giovanelli (2019) 
emphasize, for Einstein, realism ‘is not a philosophical doctrine about the 
interpretation of scientific theories or the semantics of theoretical terms. For 
Einstein, realism is a physical postulate.’ This physical postulate is spatial 
separability, i.e., physical systems situated in different parts of space should (in 
theory) have an existence independent of each other. Finally, Einstein evaluates 
the prospects for the success of the program of the real thus:  
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‘Will this credo survive forever? It seems to me a smile is the best answer.’ 
(Einstein 1950; 758) 
That is, whether we could know reality through physical description in the ideal 
limit in which our theorizing finally result, remains to be seen. 
 
5. The Problem of the Evolution of the Quantum State 
Hitherto, we have discussed the epistemic nature of the quantum state and its 
consequences in the static case i.e. at a given time. In this section, we will discuss 
the time evolution of the quantum state according to QBism.  
According to QBism, quantum states are probability assignments of the agent 
concerning her expectations for the outcomes of measurements on the quantum 
system. Brown (2017) argues that QBism has no resources to account for the 
evolution of the quantum state. Suppose the quantum system evolves freely over 
an interval of time without any measurements taking place. It follows, Brown 
claims, that the probability assignments of the agent does not change during this 
interval because there are no measurements and consequently the agent does 
not receive new information to update her probability assignments. That is, in 
QBism there is no evolution of the quantum state during the interval between 
measurements. However, we know that the quantum state evolves during this 
interval according to the Schrödinger evolution. Brown criticizes this with the 
following comment,  
‘It is as if von Neumann’s two motions in quantum mechanics have reappeared in 
a different guise! The difference now is that the mystery lies with the unitary 
evolution.’ (Brown 2017; 17)  
But, we do not think that Brown’s argument is justified. In QBism, quantum states 
and evolutions along with the outcomes of measurements live on the subjective 
factor. According to QBism, just as quantum states are personal judgments the 
unitary time evolutions are personal judgments too. To see this, let us again 
consider equation (6) of Section 2. This equation expresses the agent’s 
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probabilities under the assumption that the SIC measurement is not performed. 
In other words, it is a conditional probability expressing a counterfactual 
situation. That is, the probabilities for the actual measurement outcomes  𝐸𝑗   
depend on the probabilities for the hypothetical SIC measurement outcomes 
𝑝 𝑂𝑖 . Now, let us make the actual measurement a unitarily rotated version of 
the SIC measurement. Then,  
𝐸𝑗 =  
1
𝑑
𝑈Π𝑗𝑈
†                                                                                                                    (8) 
which implies a simplification of equation (6) to,  
𝑄 𝐸𝑗  =  𝑑 + 1  𝑝 𝑂𝑖 𝑝 𝐸𝑗  𝑂𝑖 −
1
𝑑
𝑑2
𝑖=1
                                                                   (9) 
for the probabilities of the actual measurement outcomes (Fuchs and Stacey 
2019). Equation (9) shows that the unitary time evolution 𝑈 is a variant of the Law 
of Total Probability.7 This is because in the Schrödinger picture one could regard 
𝑝 𝑂𝑖  and 𝑄 𝐸𝑗   as the SIC representations for the initial and final quantum 
states under the evolution 𝑈. It should be emphasized that all the terms in 
equation (9) refer to the probability assignments that the agent makes at a single 
time, although these assignments are about the outcomes of a hypothetical SIC 
measurement that could happen at two different times in the future. So, the 
unitary time evolution 𝑈  is the personal judgment 𝑝 𝐸𝑗  𝑂𝑖 . Furthermore, it 
resolves the issue of why there should be two kinds of state evolution, one upon 
measurement and the other due to unitary evolution. As Fuchs (2010; 13) puts it, 
‘there are not two things that a quantum state can do, only one: Strive to be 
consistent with all the agent’s other probabilistic judgments on the consequences 
of his actions, factual and counterfactual’.  
Thus, unitarity is a consistency constraint guiding the agent on how to relate her 
beliefs about a measurement to be performed at different circumstances namely, 
a measurement that could be performed either at time 𝑡1 or at time 𝑡2 in the 
                                                             
7
 . See also Stacey (2016). 
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agent’s future. These beliefs are held by the agent simultaneously at a definite 
time. So, the unitary time evolution formula 
𝜌′ = 𝑈 𝑡 𝜌𝑈†(𝑡)                                                                                                            (10) 
guides the agent on how to relate her probability assignments for a measurement 
at 𝑡1 to her probability assignment for the same measurement at 𝑡2 using the 
unitary map 𝑈 𝑡 . 
More importantly, the real mystery with regard to the evolution of the quantum 
state is this: why unitarity in the first place? It has all to do with probabilities. As 
Hughes (1989, 115) illustrates if we ‘consider a state just as a probability function 
on a set of experimental questions’ along with a few other plausible assumptions 
we could derive the unitary structure of quantum theory. Further in this direction, 
Appleby et al. (2017) show that the unitary symmetry specifies all of the defining 
features of quantum theory. But why this symmetry group in particular? There is 
no satisfactory answer yet. That is, we know that regarding quantum states as 
‘catalogues of expectations’ and assuming unitarity one could reconstruct 
quantum theory. Formally, these two assumptions are our axioms.  
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have argued for the following claims. First, it is argued that the 
charge of the existence of an explanatory gap in QBism regarding the objective 
description of the world stems from a particular conception of the nature of 
physical theories that QBists are not committed to and seek to correct. According 
to this representationalist view, theories must or do represent reality as it is in 
itself. However, for QBists, quantum theory concerns what we expect from our 
actions or interventions on the world rather than a third-person representation of 
it. Moreover, this provides an answer to Brown’s ‘problem of the past’. That is, 
how can QBism account for events in the past history of the world? According to 
the QBist conception of scientific theories, what we say about the past ultimately 
concerns what we expect about the future. Our scientific beliefs about the past 
concern our conceptual models to account for the current data and observations. 
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Second, it is argued that there is no essential difference between Einstein’s 
program of the real and the QBists’ program. Drawing upon Born’s notion of 
invariance as the mark of the real, it is argued that both programs do regard and 
try to discover invariances as what is real or objective. Moreover, in both 
programs, the aim of scientific theories is to guide us through the maze of 
experience and accordingly the sole justification for our theories or conceptual 
systems is their success in doing so. Third, it has been shown how in QBism, just 
as quantum states are personal judgments, so it is with unitary time evolutions. 
Contra Brown, there is nothing more mysterious about unitary evolution than 
quantum collapse (i.e., state update due to measurement) or even the Born rule 
itself: they all have the character of normative principles. QBism is not so simply 
dismissed.  
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